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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of U.S. firms as
measured by beta from the Capital Asset Pricing Model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There
are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of
accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and
liabilities are off-balance sheet, and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with
its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation further clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk.
The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect
the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is
consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate
finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure
uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets.  But the de-
leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities.   Failure to make
this adjustment will typically bias upwards estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The
magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known U.S. companies. This
















1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, we examine the empirical question of whether real-world equity returns reflect the 
risk of corporate pension plans.  We focus on the systematic risk of the firm and use beta from 
the Sharpe (1964) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the measure of such risk
1. 
 
There are many reasons why pension risk might not be reflected in equity returns.  Pension plan 
assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet, and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the 
firm. Pension plans indeed have their own trustees, and pension accounting rules are 
complicated.  Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) as 
guarantor of corporate pension benefits to employees complicates the actual relation between the 
risk of the pension plan and the risk of the firm equity. 
There is a substantial literature in economics and finance studying “value transparency”, or 
whether pension assets and pension liabilities affect the market valuation of firms. 
Representative papers include Oldfield (1977), Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and 
Morck (1983), Bodie et al. (1987), Bulow et al. (1987) and Bodie and Papke (1992). These 
papers provide considerable empirical evidence that the equity market valuation of firms takes 
into account the difference between the value of pension plan assets and its liabilities, i.e.,  the 
pension surplus or deficit (if that difference is negative). Carroll and Niehaus (1998) confirm 
those findings in a parallel test of debt market recognition of the value of the pension surplus or 
deficit, by empirically examining the positive relation between funding of defined-benefit 
pension funds and debt ratings.  Furthermore, in both equity and debt markets, there seems to be 
an asymmetric pattern in the impact of changes in pensions assets and liabilities on the market 
value of the firm and on debt ratings: while each dollar increase in liabilities lowers the market 
value of the firm by about a dollar, an equal increase in pension assets raises the firm’s market 
value by less than a dollar. Similarly, a pension deficit reduces debt ratings by more than the 
same size pension surplus increases debt ratings. This is consistent with the view that, while an 
                                                 
1 Although the explicit measure of systematic risk used here is in the context of the CAPM, the same approach can 
be applied to “multiple beta” asset pricing models, such as the Fama-French Three-Factor Model (1996), the Ross 
(1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory, and the Intertemporal CAPM (Merton, 1992, Chapter 15). We are confident that 
the core empirical findings given here for the CAPM will remain robust with respect to these alternative 
specifications of systematic risk. 4 
under-funded pension liability should be fully reflected as a corporate liability, over-funded 
pension assets are not entirely a corporate asset, due to the difficulty of converting an over-
funded pension plan’s assets into unemcumbered corporate assets.   
However, there has been almost no analysis in the literature, either theoretical or empirical, about 
how the risk level of a defined-benefit pension plan affects the risk of the market value of the 
firm. As we shall see, value transparency does not necessarily imply risk transparency. The 
former is a static measure, whereas the latter is a dynamic measure. To our knowledge, our paper 
is the first to focus on dynamic measurement by testing whether pension-plan systematic risk is 
reflected in firm equity risk.  
 
Since estimates of beta play a pivotal role in performance evaluation and in the estimated cost of 
capital calculation, accurate estimation of beta is crucial. The question we address therefore has 
important implications for the correct calculation of operating-asset beta and tests of market 
efficiency, regardless of the direction of the answer. 
 
i)  On the one hand, if pension risk is not accurately reflected in the firm’s equity beta 
(which implies that the market is informationally inefficient) then, standard analysis 
will usually underestimate the true systematic risk of the firm. This underestimation 
of risk may lead to the appearance of superior corporate performance on a risk-
adjusted basis and that in turn would lead to a pattern of overvaluation of the firm.  
 
ii)  On the other hand, if the firm’s equity beta does accurately reflect its pension plan 
risk, it can have significant implication for corporate finance in estimating a firm’s 
cost of capital. The standard methodology for calculating the cost of capital treats it 
as a weighted average of the cost of equity and the after-tax cost of debt (which is the 
pre-tax cost of debt adjusted for the tax shield generate by the corporate debt)
2. Such 
calculation implicitly neglects the pension plan, or, it assumes that the pension 
assets/liabilities have just the same risk characteristics as the operating asset and 
therefore do not need to be counted separately. The plain facts are that pension plan 
                                                 
2 See, for examples, Brealey and Myers (2002), Copeland and Weston (1992), Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002) 
and Van Horne and Wachowicz (1995). 5 
assets and liabilities are substantial for many firms, and they would only 
coincidentally have the same risk characteristics as the operating assets. As will be 
demonstrated, large estimation biases for the firms’ operating betas can exist in such 
cases. 
 
The paper is organized into three sections: (1) a theory section in which we derive the theoretical 
asset beta for the firm’s operating asset as a function of the firm’s equity beta, pension-asset beta, 
debt and pension liability beta. From this, we derive the specification errors in the estimation of 
the operating asset beta if pension assets and liabilities are completely ignored, and if the value 
of the pension plan is correctly taken into account but not its risk. For a selected sample of firms 
we show as an empirical matter that the resulting overstatement of the cost of capital can be 
substantial; (2) an empirical section in which we use the theoretical specifications to study U.S. 
pension-plan risk using time series data from 1993 to 1998 for companies filing ERISA form 
5500. This period was prior to the sharp and sustained decline in the stock market, particularly 
NASDAQ, in 2000-2002, and the subsequent media spotlight on pension-plan risk. We find that 
the market risk of the firm’s equity reflects the risk level of the pension plan; (3) a robustness 
section to examine the sensitivity of test findings to our assumptions. We find our results to be 
robust. 
 
1.  The Theory
3 
 
In the United States, when a company sponsors a defined-benefit pension plan, the plan’s assets 
and liabilities, although segregated, are, in economic terms, assets and liabilities of the company. 
The company and its pension plan as a consolidated entity have three groups with a claim on the 
firm’s total assets:  (1) the employees,--retired and active, (2) the investors -- shareholders and 
creditors, and (3) the government, through corporate taxes and corporate pension benefit 
guarantees.  The employees’ claim on the retirement benefits, the pension liability, is a debt-like 
liability of the firm, secured by the pension assets as specific collateral. 
 
                                                 
3 This section is based on Merton (2002). 6 
Ignoring the effect of taxes and the PBGC, we derive the relations between pension-plan risk and 
firm equity risk, and discuss how the firm’s operating-asset risk can be correctly estimated from 
the pension-plan risk and observed equity risk. We then derive the structure of estimation 
specification errors in measuring firm operating-asset risk when pension risk is accounted for 
improperly. In doing so, we analyze two circumstances: 1) that the entire pension plan, assets 
and liabilities, is totally neglected in the estimation of operating-asset risk; 2) the values of 
pension assets and liabilities are correctly taken into account, but the risks of plan assets and 
liabilities are not. We then discuss the effect of corporate tax and the role of PBGC. 
 
2.1 The estimation of operating-asset risk from pension and stock market data 
 




OA as the value of operating assets, E as the value of Equity, D as the value of Debt, PA as the 
value of pension assets, PL as the value of pension liabilities, S=PA-PL as pension surplus, L = 
D/E as the leverage ratio.  By the balance sheet identity we have that: 
 
  Assets OA PA E D PL Liabilities =+= + +=  
 
We examine three possible cases:  
 
Correct Case: The calculation of operating-asset risk correctly incorporates both the value and 
the risk characteristic of the pension plan; 
 
The beta of operating assets,  OA β , when both the pension value and pension risk are correctly 
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If both the value and the risk of the pension plan are ignored, then the estimated operating-asset 
beta becomes 
ˆ ˆ DE
OA D E ED ED ββ β ++ =+                        (2) 
 
Subtracting (1) from (2), we have that the resulting estimation specification error, defined as 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆOA OA OA ε ββ =−, is: 
 
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ () []
S PA
OA PA PL OA PL OA OA εβ ββ β =− −−            (3) 
where  ˆ OA OA S =+ . 
 
Proof: see appendix. 
By inspection of (3), a sufficient condition for  ˆ ˆ 0 OA ε ≥  is  , , , 0 PA PL OA PL and S β ββ β ≥≥ ≤ . 
These conditions are often satisfied in reality, indicating that there is specification error on the 
estimate of the operating-asset beta, which generally has a positive bias, if one ignores the risk 
and value of defined-benefit pension plans. 
 
Error Case 2: The calculation of risk includes the pension plan value, but neglects any difference 
in risk between pension assets and pension liabilities
5.  
 
If we assume that pension asset and pension liability risk are the same and equal to the risk of the 
debt of the firm:  ˆˆ
PA PL D β ββ == ,
6 then the risk of the operating assets is given by: 
                                                 
4 The standard textbook treatments typically calculate the WACC as the weighted average cost of debt and equity, 
with no adjustment for pension risks. See examples cited in footnote 2. 
5 It recognizes the surplus or shortfall in pension-plan value, perhaps because it appears as a net entry on the firm’s 
balance sheet but it treats that surplus or shortfall as having the same beta as debt. 8 
() ˆ D S E
OA E D OA OA ββ β
− =+               (4) 
 
Thus, subtracting (1) from (4), the specification error in the estimated beta is given by: 
 
ˆ () () PL PA
OA D PL PA D OA OA ε ββ β β =− + −              (5) 
 
Proof: see appendix. 
 
 
In practice, the risk levels of pension liabilities and firm debt are similar for firms with normal 
leverage ratios, whereas the portion of pension assets that are invested in equities will have 
significantly higher beta risk than the firm debt.  Neglecting this higher pension asset risk will 
lead to a positive bias in the estimation of the beta of the operating assets.  
 
The biases from ignoring the pension asset risk can be substantial. The biases from counting the 
value of the pension plan but ignoring the risk of pension plans can also be large. In Table 1.1. 
and Table 1.2. we underscore this point with four examples of well-known large firms.  
 
[Insert Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 around here.] 
 
In Table 1.2 we posit that the pension liability has the same beta as the firm’s debt, both assumed 
to be 0.175.  We further posit that 60% of the pension fund is invested in the equity market and 
the rest are invested in debt with a beta of 0.175, and thus the overall beta for pension assets is 
assumed to be 0.67.  This is a conservative estimate of the pension asset beta for typical firms.  
Indeed, the PBGC recommended that pension plans invest 60%-80% of the pension asset in 
equities
7, and during the bull market of the 1990s many firms did just that.  
 
    Substituting these assumed beta values into equation (5), we get: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Once the value of the pension plan is taken into account, some risk level has to be assigned to its assets and 
liabilities for the calculation of firm operating-asset risk. It is generally incorrect to assume that pension assets have 
the same risk as pension liabilities. If the debt of the firm is highly rated with a similar duration as the pension 
liabilities, it is reasonable to treat them as having the same systematic risk.  
7 For example, see Bodie (1996). 9 
ˆ (0.67 0.175) 0.495
PA PA
OA OA OA ε =− =                 (6) 
 
By inspection of Table 1.1., three of the firms’ plans are over-funded, and the fourth, Du Pont, 
has a small pension deficit. All four firms, however, have pension assets that are very large 
relative to their market capitalization. The correct estimates of operating-asset beta for these four 
firms are 0.16, 0.45, 0.35 and 0.26, respectively, but the flawed procedure that ignores the 
pension plan altogether produces estimates of operating-asset betas of 0.54, 0.63, 0.68, 0.43, 
respectively.  The estimation errors are large, and the operating-asset betas are overstated by 
between 40% and 250%.  The last column shows that, when pension value but not pension risk is 
incorporated in the calculation, the resulting betas are still significantly different from their 
correct values. 
 
Thus, standard cost-of-capital calculations, which do not distinguish between the operating-asset 
risk and pension-plan risks, can materially overestimate the discount rate for operating projects.  
For an equity risk premium of 7%, and a risk free rate of 5%, the correct cost of capital for the 
existing operating assets of Boeing is 6.09%, but the standard approach yields 8.80%, an 
overestimate of about 45%.  For DU PONT, EASTMAN KODAK, and TEXTRON, the correct 
cost of capital are 8.15%, 7.47%, and 6.81%, respectively, while the standard approach yields 
9.44%, 9.75%, and 7.98%, respectively, for a 15% to 30% error.  
 
Effect of Corporate Taxes 
 
Now consider the effect of corporate taxes on the relation between the risk of the pension plan 
and the risk to investors in the firm.  There is a considerable range in the theory of corporate 
finance about the effect of taxes on the valuation of a firm and thus, on the risk of the firm.  The 
original controversy is focused on whether debt financing increases the total value of the firm 
relative to its value under all-equity financing.  As shown by Miller (1977), the answer hinges on 
the complex interaction between corporate and personal taxation in a general model of capital 
market equilibrium.   
 10 
Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) examine the effect of corporate taxes on the valuation of 
corporate pension assets and liabilities. Under symmetric assumptions about contribution 
opportunities, tax payments and rebates, they conclude that a $1 change in the pre-tax value of 
pension surplus (i.e., assets minus liabilities) causes $(1-t) change in the value of the firm where 
t is the effective corporate tax rate. Thus, the government bears fraction t of the pension-surplus 
risk through taxes. 
 
Bulow, Morck and Summers (1987) revisit the question and conclude that depending on the 
extent to which the ceiling on pension fund contributions can be binding, the relation ranges 
from (1-t) to 1.0. Beyond the theoretical complexities, there are further empirical ones: the 
effective versus statutory tax rates for real-world firms vary considerably in cross-section and for 
the same firm over time. Accounting rules that govern how pension surplus is computed for 
determining contribution limitations currently have multi-year smoothing features. Thus, in the 
absence of individual firm tax-rate data, we make no adjustment for taxes in our test 
specification in Section 3. 
 
2.2  Effect of PBGC Insurance 
 
The PBGC covers any shortfall in funding for pension plans of bankrupt firms, in effect 
providing the plan participants with a put option on the pension fund collateral for their benefits
8.  
The price charged for this PBGC insurance is not a function of either the credit quality of the 
plan sponsor or of the risk of the plan’s assets. Thus, its premium for coverage is not equal to its 
fair market value.  Distressed firms are charged less than the fair value and healthy firms are 
charged more
9.  Even if PBGC insurance were fairly priced, the insurance transfers part of the 
risk associated with the pension assets and liabilities from the corporate sponsor to the PBGC. 
PBGC insurance creates an incentive for distressed firms to underfund the pension plan and 
invest the plan in risky assets.   Bodie et al (1985) find some empirical evidence of this effect. 
At the theoretical level, the existence of the PBGC introduces a complex non-linear relation 
between the value and risk of pension assets and liabilities and the risk of investor capital for 
                                                 
8 There is a ceiling on benefits covered of $44,386 per year per employee, for the year 2004. 
9 The detailed procedures for setting pension premium can be found from the PBGC website, at 
http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/PREMFACT.htm. 11 
corporations that are in financial distress
10. Partly for this reason, we focus in our empirical 
analysis on firms that are not in distress. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
In the preceding section we derive the risk relations among the firm’s assets and liabilities when 
they are fully recognized by investors and measured at market prices.  In this section we explore 
the question: do those relations hold in practice?  We consider, as an empirical matter, the extent 
to which a company’s pension funding status and asset mix are incorporated in the risk of its 
equity.  Specifically we test the hypothesis that a higher pension-plan risk translates into a higher 
overall firm market risk, and we also try to estimate the magnitude of the pension risk-firm risk 
relation.  
 
3.1  Data and measurement of variables  
 
The data used in our study cover the period from 1993-1998. They come from three sources—
IRS Form 5500 filings, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP.  The Form 5500 provides asset class 
information for each plan sponsored by a company.  The assets are disaggregated into categories 
such as certificates of deposit, U.S. government securities, corporate debt instruments and 
common stocks and reported at market value. COMPUSTAT provides company-level data about 
total pension liabilities and other balance sheet and income statement variables reported by the 
firm.  We match data from the two sources to create a merged company-level data set.
11  
COMPUSTAT data are created from company 10-K reports, which is released with a much 
shorter time lag than Form 5500 data. The COMPUSTAT data is also more widely used by 
market participants.  CRSP data are used to calculate equity betas for the firms in our sample. 
 
From these data, we compute the market risk exposure from the pension plan by making certain 
assumptions about the beta risk of various categories of assets and liabilities. Table 2 contains 
                                                 
10 See Bodie (1996) for the discussion about the PBGC “pension put”. 
11 The Form 5500 data tape is made available to the public with roughly a 2-year lag.  Sponsors of any plan with 
more than 100 employees are required by law to file the form.  12 
the assumptions about beta for various asset classes that we use in computing the total risk of 
pension assets and pension liabilities.
12 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
From the firm’s balance sheet identity we have that E DO AP AP L + =+−, the firm’s invested 
capital, defined as debt plus equity, equals the value of operating assets plus the pension-plan 
surplus.  
 
Define the capital-structure risk, i.e., the systematic risk borne by the equity and debt holders of 
the firm as ED E D
ED
ED ED
ββ β + =+
++









Thus there is a one-to-one relation between the risk of the firm’s capital structure, measured by 








. Namely, we have that 
ED P e n s i o n O A
OA
ED
β ββ + =+
+
  (6) 
 
To estimate the equity betas, we use weekly data for one year (up to 52 observations). To make 
sure our beta estimate is meaningful, we eliminate stocks that have not been traded for more than 
43 weeks during a year.  Since we are using relatively higher frequency data, to adjust for non-
synchronous trading, we employ Dimson’s (1979) adjustment with one lag and no leads to 
calculate the beta. To test robustness, we also examined different specifications of leads and lags 





                                                 
12 These estimates of the beta risk for asset categories are drawn from a study done by Harvard Management 
Company to calculate the portfolio choices for the firm. The numbers are cited from Light (2001). 13 
Restriction to non-distressed firms 
 
We restrict our attention to firms that are not in financial distress, for several reasons. First, for 
distressed firms, one must take into account the effect of the guarantee provided by the Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation. Second, we do not have data on the market value of the debt of 
the firm, so we use the book value of debt as an approximation for market value. This proxy will 
work reasonably well when the firm is not in distress, since the market value of the debt typically 
does not deviate significantly from the book value of debt
13.  But this is not true for debt of firms 
in financial distress, which can sell at a discount to book value and often trades with an equity-
like beta.  Third, the betas of the debt and equity of firms in distress are nonlinear functions of 
the value of the firm
14.   
 
We use three empirical measures to identify the financially distressed firms: 1) return on 
investment as a measure of operating-business distress, 2) leverage as a measure of financial 
distress, and 3) book/market value as a combination measure of both types of distress.
15  In each 
year in our sample, we rank all firms in the previous year by each measure of distress, and take 
the decile of firms with the most severe measure as distressed, and the rest as non-distressed. We 
subsequently run regressions for the next year only on firms that are not in distress in the 
previous year.  Most of the tables in the body of the paper only report regression results using the 
book-market ratio as the measure of distress
16. However, the full results, using all three measures 
of distress, are presented in the appendix. 
 
 
                                                 
13 A caveat: even for non-distressed firms, interest-rate changes can cause significant changes in the value of fixed- 
rate debt value. Indeed, the 0.175 estimate for the beta of debt used throughout the paper is primarily the result of 
estimated correlations between interest rate changes and equity returns during the sample period and not the risk of 
default.  With the widespread use of interest-rate swaps by corporations, it is not easy to determine the effect of 
interest-rate changes on firm and equity values. We have nevertheless explored this effect and tried to adjust the 
book value of debt by the change in the market interest rate to better approximate the market value of debt. Such 
adjustments give results that are consistent with those reported in the paper, suggesting that the adjustment for book-
market value difference in debt is not driving the results of the paper.  Detailed results are available upon request.  
14 See Merton (1992), chapters 11, 12. 
15 Use of these measures as indicators for financial and operating-business distress can be found in Andrade and 
Kaplan (1998). 
16 We recognize that for the Fama-French (1992) model, book-to-market is a systematic risk factor, not necessarily 
associated only with distress. As discussed in Section 4.A, excluding or including this group in the firm sample does 
not affect our findings. 14 
3.2 Test results and interpretation 
 
We fit the following time-series regression: 
 
     ED P e n s i o n a β γβ ε + =+ +     (7) 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, pension liabilities exhibit strong serial correlation. In addition, firm 
pension asset allocation decisions also change slowly over time. This gives a justification that we 
could still run the regressions in the paper, even that some of the information from pension asset 
holdings might not be immediately revealed to all the market participants: most of the difference 
in pension asset risk is cross-sectional, rather than time-series, thus by observing the lagged 
pension asset allocation decision of a firm, one can infer with reasonable accuracy the current 
period pension risk profile
17. To guard against cross-correlation and serial correlation, we 
employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology, and further adjust the t-statistics using the 
approach by Pontiff (1996)
18. 
 
The regression coefficients and their t-statistics are reported in Table 3. The results indicate a 
positive relation between pension-plan risk and firm risk: one unit of pension risk increases the 
firm risk by 1.7-2.0 units. The relation is statistically significant, although the point estimates are 
larger than the theoretical value of 1.0. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here.] 
 
Consider now the further implicit assumption underlying the specification in (7). By inspection 
of equation (6), firm risk is affected by the risk of both pension assets and non-pension assets. 
                                                 
17 As shown in Appendix A, it is not entirely clear when the public get information about pension positions, as some 
pension asset holding information might be released to the public rapidly. To the extent that insiders but not the 
general public know the current pension positions, our test of the relation between current period pension risk and 
current period capital structure risk would constitute a test of the strong form of efficient market hypothesis. 
18 Pontiff (1996) realizes that, in a setting of serious serial correlation, because the slope coefficients in the Fama-
MacBeth regressions are persistent through time, the Fama-MacBeth standard errors could still be biased downward. 
He proposes correcting for such bias by regression the time-series of the parameter estimates on an intercept term 
and modeling the residuals as an autoregressive process. As we have six years of data, we model the residuals as an 
AR(1). Changing the specification to AR(2) doesn’t qualitatively affect the results in the paper. 15 
The regression specification in (7) gives an unbiased estimate of the impact of pension risk only 
if the omitted variable, non-pension operating-asset risk, is uncorrelated with the pension-asset 
risk. Such an assumption is clearly unfounded. Much of the risk in the pension fund comes from 
its equity holdings and these are of course highly correlated with non-pension asset risk of the 
firm. As another, more subtle source of correlation, some firm managements may take an 
integrated perspective in managing their firms’ pension and non-pension risk, causing pension 
and non-pension risk to potentially be correlated. We do not have a direct measure of the non-
pension asset risk and so in an expanded specification, we substitute control variables as proxies 
for differences in the non-pension operating asset risks across the firms. Our choice of control 
variables is influenced by prior research identifying selected variables that are significant in the 
study of the impact of pension value on firm value. By using these variables in an expanded 
specification, we can also see if our significant findings in the univariate analysis of pension-
fund risk recognition by the market in (7) is just a surrogate for the variables that were used in 
earlier studies to test whether pension plan value is recognized in a firm’s stock price. As we 
shall see, that is not the case.  
 
The list of control variables and the detailed procedure to construct them is in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 around here.] 
 
The results of the regression with control variables are listed in Table 5, which reports explicitly 
only the coefficient estimates and their significance for the pension-plan risk variable as in (7). 
The complete regression results, including coefficients for all control variables and using all 
three measures of financial distress, are in the appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here.] 
 
As can be seen, the coefficient on pension risk is smaller in magnitude, but still statistically very 
significant. Furthermore, the point estimate of the coefficient is not significantly different from 16 
the theoretically predicted 1.0
19, if the market correctly incorporated pension-plan risk into its 
estimate of equity risk. 
 
4. Robustness Checks 
 
A. Distressed firms 
 
As discussed, distressed firms are likely to have a distinctly different pattern than non-distressed 
firms. Thus we re-run the regression analysis specified in Table 5 with the distressed firms 
subsample. The results are reported in Table 6.  
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
Inspection of Table 6 shows that the relation between pension risk and firm risk is insignificant 
for these firms. 
 
We also re-run the regressions of Table 5, with the full sample (both distressed and non-
distressed firms). The results are in Table 7. 
 
[Insert Table 7 around here.] 
 
We see that even when the full sample is used, the relation between pension risk and firm risk is 
still significant and in the predicted direction. Thus, the a priori choice to exclude distressed 
firms does not change the core findings. 
 
 
                                                 
19 We have also estimated the model with separate coefficients on pension asset risk and pension liability risk. We 
find that the pension asset risk has a positive impact on firm risk, and pension liability risk has a negative impact on 
firm risk. Both effects are statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on pension asset risk is smaller than 
the coefficient on pension liability risk, mirroring the findings in the studies looking at the differential impacts on 
firm value of the level of pension assets versus pension liabilities. Our potential explanation for the larger weighting 
on pension liabilities than on assets is that the change in pension liabilities is strongly correlated with interest rate 
changes and the change in pension assets are strongly correlated with stock returns and the CAPM single-variable 
descriptor is not adequate to deal with it. 
 17 
B. filtered tests 
 
One concern with the interpretation of our findings is that there are likely to be many firms that 
have negligible pension assets/liabilities compared with the firm assets. For these firms, we 
would expect that pension risk would not have a first-order impact on the overall firm risk, 
especially considering the various other factors that might affect the firm risk. Thus, including 
these observations in our regression analysis would not likely add information, and thus dilute 
the fit of the true relation we are attempting to estimate. With this in mind, we also run 
regressions which require either 1) that pension assets represent greater than a certain percentage 






), or 2) that the product of pension asset beta risk 







). We use threshold levels 
ranging from 2% to 20%, and the results are qualitatively the same.  
 
Table 8 reports the filtered test results for a 2 percent threshold with non-distressed firms 
selected by book-to-market ratio only. Other measures of distress give qualitatively similar 
results and are presented in the appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 8 around here.] 
 
Again, our test results support the hypothesis that market seems to react to the risk level of the 
pension plan as predicted: a higher pension risk will increase the total market risk of the firm 




This paper focuses on an important but previously neglected area of corporate finance: namely 
the impact of off-balance-sheet and non-operating risks on the risk of a firm's equity and the bias 
it may induce in estimation of the firm’s cost of capital for capital budgeting. The paper's 
specific focus is a corporation's defined-benefit pension plan, which for many firms is as large as 18 
the market capitalization of the firm sponsoring the plan. Current accounting rules for corporate 
pensions are complicated and opaque. We examine the potential biases that can be introduced in 
the market's perception of a company's equity risk by ignoring the risk of its pension assets and 
liabilities, and we perform empirical tests to determine whether such a bias exists in practice. 
 
The central empirical finding of the paper is that the stock market seems to process the available 
pension information without bias despite the practical difficulties of deciphering corporate 
pension accounts. Using the best publicly available U.S. data, our regression tests indicate that 
equity betas of firms do appear to accurately reflect the betas of their pension assets and 
liabilities. That is good news for market efficiency of the capital markets. 
 
The bad news is that standard cost-of-capital calculations used in corporate finance, which do not 
distinguish between the operating-asset risk and pension-plan risk, can greatly overestimate the 
discount rate for Net Present Value analysis of operating projects. When calculating a firm's 
operating cost of capital for use in performance measurement and in capital budgeting, the 
standard approach to estimation fails to take proper account of the pension plan sponsored by the 
firm. The resulting estimate of operating-asset beta and cost of capital are almost always too 
high. As we show in Table 1.2, for some well-known companies, the calculated cost of capital 
can be more than 40% higher than its true value. In such cases, capital projects with positive Net 
Present Value may be rejected by management. 
 
In this paper, we have focused on just one non-operating risk item of the firm--- the company 
pension plan. There are other non-operating-asset-related risk exposures that might have a 
significant impact on the risk of a firm's equity and on the calculation of its cost of capital. A 
perhaps prosaic, but important one, especially for established hi-tech firms, is the net cash and 
marketable securities held by the firm. Off-balance sheet risks of the firm from derivatives and 
other significant contractual obligations including performance guarantees can potentially distort 
cost of capital estimates for its operating businesses. Empirical research on their actual impact 
remains a task for the future. 19 
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Note: Pension Asset and Pension Liability and Market Cap information are as estimated based on the 
Global Equity Research Report published by UBS Warburg, September 19, 2002. Beta of equity are 
estimated using CAPM, using data on three year monthly stock returns, obtained from CRSP, and by 
using the value-weighted return on all stocks on NYSE/AMEX/NADDAQ as the proxy for the market. Beta 
of debt is assumed, as throughout the paper, to be 0.175. Book values of debt are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. Operating asset Beta Correct is the Operation Asset Beta when correctly accounting for 
pension value and risk, Operating Asset Beta Error 1 is the Operating Asset Beta, ignoring pension plan 
altogether, and Operating Asset Beta Error 2 is the Operating Asset Beta, counting pension value but 
mis-representing pension risk. 
 
 
Table 1.1. Selected Company Balance Sheet Information for 2001 
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Table 1.2. Estimated Equity and Operating Asset Betas for 2001 










BOEING  0.69 0.16 0.54 250% 0.55 256%
DU PONT  0.71 0.45 0.63 41% 0.63  39%
EASTMAN 
KODAK  0.87 0.35 0.68 93% 0.70  99%
TEXTRON  0.73 0.26 0.43 64% 0.44  69%
            
Note: Pension Asset and Pension Liability and Market Cap information are as estimated based on the Global 
Equity Research Report published by UBS Warburg, September 19, 2002. Beta of equity are estimated using 
CAPM, using data on three year monthly stock returns, obtained from CRSP, and by using the value-weighted 
return on all stocks on NYSE/AMEX/NADDAQ as the proxy for the market. Beta of debt is assumed, as 
throughout the paper, to be 0.175. Book values of debt are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Operating asset Beta 
Correct is the Operation Asset Beta when correctly accounting for pension value and risk, Operating Asset Beta 
Error 1 is the Operating Asset Beta, ignoring pension plan altogether, and Operating Asset Beta Error 2 is the 





        
Table 2      Pension Asset Categories as reported in Form 5500, and Assumed Beta Risk   
    
        
Pension Asset Categories 
Assumed 
Beta 
Equities preferred  stock  1.000 
 common  stock  1.000 
 joint  venture  1.000 
 employer  securities  1.000 
  interest in registered investment companies  1.000 
Bonds governmental  bonds  0.175 
  corporate debt instruments (preferred and other)  0.175 
 
loans secured by mortgages (residential and 
commercial) 0.175 
  loans to participants  0.175 
 other  loans  0.175 
cash  non-interest bearing cash  0.006 
  certificates of deposit (CD)  0.006 
Real Estate  income producing real estate  0.150 
   non-income producing real estate  0.150 




      
Table 3: relation between pension risk and firm risk 
           
measure of distress  (1) (2) (3)
      
intercept 0.8730 0.8733 0.9108
  (9.7376) (9.8763) (8.9652)
pension risk  2.0117 1.699 1.9601
  (5.7812) (4.6538) (4.1523)
Adjusted R
2 0.0132 0.0112 0.0134
           
Note: This table reports regression results using ERISA form 5500 filing data from 1993 to 1998. 
The regression being run is:  ED P e n s i o n β αγ β ε + =+ + 
All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with one lagged term, 
and with the end-of-year pension data. Three measures of distress are tried: (1) return on 
investment; (2) financial leverage; (3) book-market ratio. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
and under each regression coefficients; 




          
Table 4 List of control variables 
             
  Variable Description  Calculation using COMPUSTAT Codes or Other Source 
      
  market share by value  calculated using market value and 3 digit SIC code 
  market share by sales  calculated using total sales and the 3 digit SIC code 
  capital intensiveness  DATA4/DATA6 
  cash position  DATA1/DATA6 
  financial leverage  Debt/DATA6 
  growth rate  Log(DATA6/DATA6_lag) 
  liquidity DATA4/DATA5 
  return on investment  DATA172 / DATA6 
  firm size  Log(DATA6) 
  concentration index  calculated using market value and the 3 digit SIC code 
  advertisement  DATA45/DATA6, missing value is taken to be 0 
  Research and development DATA46/DATA6, missing value is taken to be 0 








Table 5: relation between pension risk and firm risk: simple test 
     
   
Intercept -0.3378 
  (-1.0238) 
pension risk  1.1188 
  (3.7825) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2291 
     
Note: This table reports regression results using ERISA form 5500 filing data from 1993 
to 1998. The regression being run is:  ED P e n s i o n control β αγ β λ ε + = ++ +  
All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with one 
lagged term, and with the end-of-year pension data. The following control variables are 
included but their coefficients are not reported: market share by value, market share by 
sales, capital intensiveness, cash position, financial leverage, growth rate, liquidity, 
return on investment, firm size, concentration index, advertisement, research and 
development. The regression are run for firms that are not in distress, proxied by the 







Table 6: relation between pension risk and firm risk: distressed firms only 
     
 
Intercept  0.3359 
  (3.7837) 
Pension Risk  0.1133 
  (0.1932) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2031 
     
Note: This table reports regression results using ERISA form 5500 filing data from 1993 to 
1998. The regression being run is:  ED P e n s i o n control β αγ β λ ε + = ++ +  
All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with one lagged 
term, and with the end-of-year pension data. The following control variables are included but 
not reported: market share by value, market share by sales, capital intensiveness, cash 
position, financial leverage, growth rate, liquidity, return on investment, firm size, concentration 
index, advertisement, research and development. The regression are run for firms that are not 
in distress, proxied by the book-to-market ratio.T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and 






      
Table 7: test with both distressed and non-distressed firms   
          
  (1): without control (2): with control   
Intercept 0.8506 -0.3015   
  (9.7832) (-1.0132)  
Pension Risk  1.6507 1.0192  
  (3.8982) (3.5237)  
Adjusted R-squared  0.0109 0.2351  
          
Note: This table reports regression results using ERISA form 5500 filing data from 1993 to 
1998. The regression being run is:  ED P e n s i o n control β αγ β λ ε + = ++ +    
Note: All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with one 
lagged term, and with the end-of-year pension data. The following control variables are 
included in the second column, but not reported: market share by value, market share by 
sales, capital intensiveness, cash position, financial leverage, growth rate, liquidity, return on 
investment, firm size, concentration index, advertisement, research and development. The 
regressions are run for firms that are not in distress, proxied by the book-to-market ratio. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis and under each regression coefficients; 





    
Table 8: filtered test results 
        
filter used  beta_PA*PA/TA>0.02 PA/TA>0.02
Intercept -0.4698 -0.3778
  (-1.2138) (-1.0253)
Pension Risk  1.7806 1.3519
  (2.1372) (3.9832)
Adjusted R-squared  0.2575 0.2277
        
Note: This table reports regression results using ERISA form 5500 filing data from 1993 to 
1998. The regression being run is:  ED P e n s i o n control β αγ β λ ε + = ++ +  
All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with one lagged 
term, and with the end-of-year pension data. The following control variables are included but 
not reported: market share by value, market share by sales, capital intensiveness, cash 
position, financial leverage, growth rate, liquidity, return on investment, firm size, concentration 
index, advertisement, research and development. The regression are run for firms that are not 
in distress, proxied by the book-to-market ratio.T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and 
under each regression coefficients; 

















Appendix A.  Issues with the data 
 
  Despite the amount of different data files that were eventually incorporated, there is quite 
a bit of homogeneity between the data sources.  The control variables, the pension liabilities data 
all came from COMPUSTAT.  These information are released to the general public through the 
10K form, thus market should be able to incorporate these information pretty rapidly.  
 
  Tracing the first date that firm pension plan investment is released is a bit tricky. While 
corporate insiders know the pension asset allocation decision pretty rapidly, the market may or 
may not immediately get that information. The FORM 5500 data is released by ERISA with 
roughly a two-year lag. However, part of the pension funds asset allocation information might be 
available to the general public sooner, especially if these pension funds are large and self-
managed: funds are typically required by various other regulations to reveal certain information 
to the public. For example, SEC regulation 13F requires institutions (including pension funds) to 
report quarterly holdings of securities when the total holdings are above $100 million. In any 
case, the lack of timely information in pension asset allocation decisions might not be as severe a 
problem as it appears: pension asset allocation decisions empirically don’t change much over 
time, for a specific firm. A simple correlation analysis reveals that the first order auto-correlation 
between pension risk over time is more than 0.95. Thus, knowing the past asset allocation 
decisions of a firm will generally give one a very good idea about its current asset allocation 
decisions. 
 
  Research and Development and Advertisement both had many missing values.  In our 
main analysis, missing values were taken to be 0. Alternatively, adding a dummy for missing 
variables don’t qualitatively change any of our results.   
 
We combine the CRSP returns data and the COMPUSTAT data through the merged 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP database file, by merging PERMNO and GVKEY (the unique identifiers 
in CRSP and COMPUSTAT respectively). The pension asset data from Form 5500 is matched 
with the COMPUSTAT through matching the Employment Identification Number (EIN). This 
proved better than CUSIP (there are a number of redundant CUSIPs), and a test of the first 100 32 
data points showed that there was remarkably high success rate in the combination (no incorrect 
matches – although there were a handful of companies that had merged and had different names 
in one data set or the other). The only problem is, this method works to the extent that firms have 
a unique EIN. Often, but not always, when a firm is purchased by another plan, the acquired 
firms keep their old EIN as all the employment taxes are filed by the subsidiary. Thus larger firm 
and more acquisitive firms present a problem. To our knowledge, the only way to partially 
address this is to search the names of the sponsors, and this works only if it isn't an unrelated 
name of a subsidiary
20. 
 
The beta of pension asset is calculated by assigning different asset types to broad 
categories (real estate, cash, bonds, and equities), and assigning beta for each asset types. If a 
company had more than one defined benefit pension plan, the assets in the multiple plans were 
summed up. Admittedly, if we could get more accurate estimate of the exact holdings of pension 
assets, and/or more precise measures of each of the assets’ beta, that would likely improve our 
test results.  
                                                 
20 We thank Mitchell Peterson for sharing with us his experience on merging pension data with COMPUSTAT data. 33 
Appendix B.  Derivation of Equations in Section 2. 
 
1. Proof of Equation (3): 
 
If both the value and the risk of pension are ignored, then the estimated operating asset risk 
becomes 
ˆ ˆ DE
OA D E ED ED β ββ ++ =+ 
 
If we define  ˆ OA E D =+ as the “pseudo operating asset”, then, from accounting identity, 
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Plug in the definition of  ˆ ˆOA ε , we have ˆˆ ˆˆ () [ ]
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Proof of Equation (5): 
From the accounting identity, OA + S = E + D, we have, 
 
OA = E + (D – S) 
 
i.e., pension deficit is treated as a negative debt. 
 
In terms of risk calculation, we have the miscalculated operating asset beta satisfies: 
 
ˆ () OA E D OA E D S ββ β =+ −  
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Appendix C.  Complete Regression Results for tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 
 
Complete Regression results for Table 5: 
 
Table 5: relation between pension risk and firm risk: simple test 
           
measure of distress  return on investments financial leverage book-market ratio
Intercept -0.7952 -0.3622 -0.3378
 -2.9235 -0.8926 -1.0238
Gamma 1.0416 1.0193 1.1188
 2.9398 3.2879 3.7825
market share by value  8.8420 10.7988 12.8760
 1.2326 1.7299 1.7414
market share by sales  -7.4401 -8.7870 -11.4165
 -0.8755 -1.1598 -1.3662
capital intensiveness  0.3015 0.4115 0.4017
 1.2566 1.0877 1.2693
cash position  -0.2083 0.2686 0.5398
 -0.2710 0.4395 1.1857
financial leverage  -0.0622 -0.4140 -0.0133
 -0.2244 -0.5403 -0.0478
growth rate  0.2633 0.1517 -0.0598
 0.7492 0.5050 -0.1757
liquidity -0.0248 -0.0436 -0.0445
 -1.1109 -1.1748 -1.4243
return on investment  9.6204 5.1357 3.8693
 6.4126 2.3879 4.9011
firm size  0.1217 0.1149 0.1019
 2.8725 2.7580 1.8682
concentration index  0.6260 0.8150 0.9069
 0.4512 0.5232 0.5495
advertisement 2.0965 2.2420 2.1677
 1.0060 0.7462 1.0245
research and devel  8.0776 8.6934 8.7364
 1.5815 1.8014 1.9204
Adjusted R-squared  0.3100 0.2686 0.2291
           
Note: All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with one 
lagged term, and with the end-of-year pension data. T-statistics are reported under each 
regression coefficients; 
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Complete Regression Results for Table 6: 
 
Table 6: relation between pension risk and firm risk: distressed firms only 
           
measure of distress  return on investments financial leverage book-market ratio 
Intercept 0.2319 0.7395 0.3359 
 0.6590 1.7873 3.7837 
Gamma -0.6708 -0.1679 0.1133 
 -0.7805 -0.0897 0.1932 
market share by value  5.1595 14.1931 0.1050 
 1.0923 2.0565 0.0117 
market share by sales  -4.7247 -9.6382 3.0802 
 -0.8849 -1.3145 0.9460 
capital intensiveness  -0.0490 -0.0265 0.1271 
 -0.0829 -0.0740 0.5332 
cash position  0.5619 -1.2075 0.2867 
 0.5017 -1.2898 0.4263 
financial leverage  0.0498 0.0616 -0.0995 
 0.1232 0.0614 -0.2932 
growth rate  -0.0896 -0.2691 0.1077 
 -0.2062 -1.0461 0.3293 
liquidity -0.0041 -0.0415 -0.0318 
 -0.0424 -0.9517 -1.0174 
return on investment  0.1402 0.9626 0.0602 
 0.1687 0.8215 0.0866 
firm size  0.0437 0.0013 -0.0075 
 0.3699 0.0194 -0.2473 
concentration index  0.1241 -1.1822 -0.3516 
 0.0301 -0.2903 -0.7573 
advertisement -2.0094 0.8650 -1.5842 
 -0.7099 0.4698 -0.8687 
research and devel  5.3577 5.2189 -0.3865 
 1.0959 1.2303 -0.1976 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2578 0.2567 0.2031 
           
Note: All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with 
one lagged term, and with the end-of-year pension data. T-statistics are reported under 
each regression coefficients; 
      






Complete Regression Results For Table 7: 
 
Table 7: test with both distressed and non-distressed firms   
          
Intercept 0.8506 -0.3015   
 9.7832 -1.0132   
Gamma 1.6507 1.0192   
 3.8982 3.5237   
market share by value    12.2483  
   2.0389   
market share by sales    -9.6723  
   -1.3450   
capital intensiveness    0.4059  
   1.7938   
cash position    0.5403  
   1.1372   
financial leverage    -0.0833  
   -0.2325   
growth rate    -0.0176  
   -0.0695   
liquidity   -0.0456   
   -1.6812   
return on investment    3.4136  
   2.7642   
firm size    0.0993  
   1.9959   
concentration index    0.7627  
   0.4440   
advertisement   2.2807   
   1.1027   
research and devel    8.7918  
   1.9139   
Adjusted R-squared  0.0109 0.2351  
          
Note: All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model with 
one lagged term, and with the end-of-year pension data. T-statistics are reported under 
each regression coefficients; 
      





Complete Regression Results For Table 8: 
 
Table 8: filtered test results   
          
filter used  beta_PA*PA/TA>0.02 PA/TA>0.02  
Intercept -0.4698 -0.3778   
 -1.2138 -1.0253   
Gamma 1.7806 1.3519   
 2.1372 3.9832   
market share by value  12.2776 13.0770  
 2.1581 2.0683   
market share by sales  -6.8838 -12.2163  
 -0.7549 -1.4842   
capital intensiveness  -0.0158 0.3165  
 -0.0308 0.8110   
cash position  1.5404 0.7277  
 0.8461 1.2188   
financial leverage  0.3047 -0.0203  
 0.7244 -0.0751   
growth rate  -0.0511 -0.0562  
 -0.0806 -0.1901   
liquidity -0.0585 -0.0510   
 -0.7900 -1.3850   
return on investment  5.0331 3.8123  
 4.4008 4.6131   
firm size  0.0922 0.1067  
 1.2762 1.6245   
concentration index  1.9302 1.9984  
 0.8029 0.9116   
advertisement 1.6628 2.0816   
 0.6059 1.1534   
research and devel  8.0885 8.4191  
 1.7966 1.9554   
Adjusted R-squared  0.2575 0.2277  
          
Note: All results are estimated with company betas estimated using market model 
with one lagged term, and with the end-of-year pension data. T-statistics are 
reported under each regression coefficients; 
      
      
 